Network Intrusion Prevention
Use intrusion detection signatures to block traffic at network boundaries.
Techniques Addressed by Mitigation
| Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1557 | Adversary-in-the-Middle |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .001 | LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .002 | ARP Cache Poisoning |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .003 | DHCP Spoofing |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that can identify traffic patterns indicative of AiTM activity can be used to mitigate activity at the network level.[1] |
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| Enterprise | T1071 | Application Layer Protocol |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .001 | Web Protocols |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .002 | File Transfer Protocols |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .003 | Mail Protocols |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .004 | DNS |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| Enterprise | T1132 | Data Encoding |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [2] |
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| .001 | Standard Encoding |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. |
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| .002 | Non-Standard Encoding |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. |
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| Enterprise | T1602 | Data from Configuration Repository |
Configure intrusion prevention devices to detect SNMP queries and commands from unauthorized sources.[3] |
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| .001 | SNMP (MIB Dump) |
Configure intrusion prevention devices to detect SNMP queries and commands from unauthorized sources.[3] |
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| .002 | Network Device Configuration Dump |
onfigure intrusion prevention devices to detect SNMP queries and commands from unauthorized sources. Create signatures to detect Smart Install (SMI) usage from sources other than trusted director.[4] |
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| Enterprise | T1001 | Data Obfuscation |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate some obfuscation activity at the network level. |
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| .001 | Junk Data |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate some obfuscation activity at the network level. |
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| .002 | Steganography |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate some obfuscation activity at the network level. |
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| .003 | Protocol Impersonation |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate some obfuscation activity at the network level. |
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| Enterprise | T1030 | Data Transfer Size Limits |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| Enterprise | T1568 | Dynamic Resolution |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Malware researchers can reverse engineer malware variants that use dynamic resolution and determine future C2 infrastructure that the malware will attempt to contact, but this is a time and resource intensive effort.[5][6] |
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| .002 | Domain Generation Algorithms |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Malware researchers can reverse engineer malware variants that use DGAs and determine future domains that the malware will attempt to contact, but this is a time and resource intensive effort.[5][6] Malware is also increasingly incorporating seed values that can be unique for each instance, which would then need to be determined to extract future generated domains. In some cases, the seed that a particular sample uses can be extracted from DNS traffic.[7] Even so, there can be thousands of possible domains generated per day; this makes it impractical for defenders to preemptively register all possible C2 domains due to the cost. |
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| Enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .001 | Symmetric Cryptography |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .002 | Asymmetric Cryptography |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| Enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .001 | Exfiltration Over Symmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .002 | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [2] |
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| Enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [2] |
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| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[2] |
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| Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware or unusual data transfer over known tools and protocols like FTP can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. [2] |
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| Enterprise | T1104 | Multi-Stage Channels |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery |
Use network intrusion detection/prevention systems to detect and prevent remote service scans. |
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| Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| Enterprise | T1566 | Phishing |
Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments or links can be used to block activity. |
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| .001 | Spearphishing Attachment |
Network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious email attachments can be used to block activity. |
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| Enterprise | T1542 | .004 | Pre-OS Boot: ROMMONkit |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific protocols, such as TFTP, can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various network configurations. |
| .005 | Pre-OS Boot: TFTP Boot |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific protocols, such as TFTP, can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various network configurations. |
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| Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [2] |
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| .001 | Internal Proxy |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[2] |
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| .002 | External Proxy |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific C2 protocol used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool C2 signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way as to avoid detection by common defensive tools.[2] |
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| Enterprise | T1219 | Remote Access Software |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures may be able to prevent traffic to remote access services. |
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| Enterprise | T1029 | Scheduled Transfer |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary command and control infrastructure and malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. Signatures are often for unique indicators within protocols and may be based on the specific obfuscation technique used by a particular adversary or tool, and will likely be different across various malware families and versions. Adversaries will likely change tool command and control signatures over time or construct protocols in such a way to avoid detection by common defensive tools. [2] |
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| Enterprise | T1221 | Template Injection |
Network/Host intrusion prevention systems, antivirus, and detonation chambers can be employed to prevent documents from fetching and/or executing malicious payloads.[8] |
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| Enterprise | T1204 | User Execution |
If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. |
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| .001 | Malicious Link |
If a link is being visited by a user, network intrusion prevention systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. |
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| .003 | Malicious Image |
Network prevention intrusion systems and systems designed to scan and remove malicious downloads can be used to block activity. |
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| Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .001 | Dead Drop Resolver |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .002 | Bidirectional Communication |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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| .003 | One-Way Communication |
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems that use network signatures to identify traffic for specific adversary malware can be used to mitigate activity at the network level. |
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References
- Microsoft. (2006, August 31). DHCP Server Operational Events. Retrieved March 7, 2022.
- Gardiner, J., Cova, M., Nagaraja, S. (2014, February). Command & Control Understanding, Denying and Detecting. Retrieved April 20, 2016.
- US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Alert (TA18-106A) Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
- US-CERT. (2018, April 20). Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Targeting Network Infrastructure Devices. Retrieved October 19, 2020.
- Sternfeld, U. (2016). Dissecting Domain Generation Algorithms: Eight Real World DGA Variants. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
- Kasza, A. (2015, February 18). Using Algorithms to Brute Force Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
- Liu, H. and Yuzifovich, Y. (2018, January 9). A Death Match of Domain Generation Algorithms. Retrieved February 18, 2019.
- Intel_Acquisition_Team. (2018, March 1). Credential Harvesting and Malicious File Delivery using Microsoft Office Template Injection. Retrieved July 20, 2018.