Fox Kitten is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. Fox Kitten has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.[1][2][3][4]
Name | Description |
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UNC757 | |
PIONEER KITTEN | |
Parisite |
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Enterprise | T1087 | .001 | Account Discovery: Local Account |
Fox Kitten has accessed ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat on compromised hosts.[5] |
.002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Fox Kitten has used the Softerra LDAP browser to browse documentation on service accounts.[5] |
||
Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
Fox Kitten has used 7-Zip to archive data.[5] |
Enterprise | T1217 | Browser Bookmark Discovery |
Fox Kitten has used Google Chrome bookmarks to identify internal resources and assets.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1110 | Brute Force |
Fox Kitten has brute forced RDP credentials.[4] |
|
Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter |
Fox Kitten has used a Perl reverse shell to communicate with C2.[4] |
|
.001 | PowerShell |
Fox Kitten has used PowerShell scripts to access credential data.[5] |
||
.003 | Windows Command Shell |
Fox Kitten has used cmd.exe likely as a password changing mechanism.[5] |
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Enterprise | T1136 | .001 | Create Account: Local Account |
Fox Kitten has created a local user account with administrator privileges.[4] |
Enterprise | T1555 | .005 | Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers |
Fox Kitten has used scripts to access credential information from the KeePass database.[5] |
Enterprise | T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage Object |
Fox Kitten has obtained files from the victim's cloud storage instances.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1213 | Data from Information Repositories |
Fox Kitten has accessed victim security and IT environments and Microsoft Teams to mine valuable information.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
Fox Kitten has searched local system resources to access sensitive documents.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1039 | Data from Network Shared Drive |
Fox Kitten has searched network shares to access sensitive documents.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1585 | Establish Accounts |
Fox Kitten has created KeyBase accounts to communicate with ransomware victims.[4][6] |
|
.001 | Social Media Accounts |
Fox Kitten has used a Twitter account to communicate with ransomware victims.[4] |
||
Enterprise | T1546 | .008 | Event Triggered Execution: Accessibility Features |
Fox Kitten has used sticky keys to launch a command prompt.[5] |
Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Fox Kitten has exploited known vulnerabilities in Fortinet, PulseSecure, and Palo Alto VPN appliances.[1][3][2][5][4] |
|
Enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services |
Fox Kitten has exploited known vulnerabilities in remote services including RDP.[1][2][4] |
|
Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
Fox Kitten has used WizTree to obtain network files and directory listings.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Fox Kitten has downloaded additional tools including PsExec directly to endpoints.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1036 | .004 | Masquerading: Masquerade Task or Service |
Fox Kitten has named the task for a reverse proxy lpupdate to appear legitimate.[5] |
.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location |
Fox Kitten has named binaries and configuration files svhost and dllhost respectively to appear legitimate.[5] |
||
Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery |
Fox Kitten has used tools including NMAP to conduct broad scanning to identify open ports.[5][4] |
|
Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information |
Fox Kitten has base64 encoded scripts and payloads to avoid detection.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Fox Kitten has used prodump to dump credentials from LSASS.[5] |
.003 | OS Credential Dumping: NTDS |
Fox Kitten has used Volume Shadow Copy to access credential information from NTDS.[5] |
||
Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling |
Fox Kitten has used protocol tunneling for communication and RDP activity on compromised hosts through the use of open source tools such as Ngrok and custom tool SSHMinion.[2][5][4] |
|
Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy |
Fox Kitten has used the open source reverse proxy tools including FRPC and Go Proxy to establish connections from C2 to local servers.[5][4][6] |
|
Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry |
Fox Kitten has accessed Registry hives ntuser.dat and UserClass.dat.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1021 | .001 | Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol |
Fox Kitten has used RDP to log in and move laterally in the target environment.[5][4] |
.002 | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Fox Kitten has used valid accounts to access SMB shares.[5] |
||
.004 | Remote Services: SSH |
Fox Kitten has used the PuTTY and Plink tools for lateral movement.[5] |
||
.005 | Remote Services: VNC |
Fox Kitten has installed TightVNC server and client on compromised servers and endpoints for lateral movement.[5] |
||
Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery |
Fox Kitten has used Angry IP Scanner to detect remote systems.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Fox Kitten has used Scheduled Tasks for persistence and to load and execute a reverse proxy binary.[5][4] |
Enterprise | T1505 | .003 | Server Software Component: Web Shell |
Fox Kitten has installed web shells on compromised hosts to maintain access.[5][4] |
Enterprise | T1552 | .001 | Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files |
Fox Kitten has accessed files to gain valid credentials.[5] |
Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Fox Kitten has used valid credentials with various services during lateral movement.[5] |
|
Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service |
Fox Kitten has used Amazon Web Services to host C2.[4] |