Operation Wocao described activities carried out by a China-based cyber espionage adversary. Operation Wocao targeted entities within the government, managed service providers, energy, health care, and technology sectors across several countries, including China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Operation Wocao used similar TTPs and tools to APT20, suggesting a possible overlap.[1]
Domain | ID | Name | Use | |
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Enterprise | T1087 | .002 | Account Discovery: Domain Account |
Operation Wocao has used the |
Enterprise | T1560 | .001 | Archive Collected Data: Archive via Utility |
Operation Wocao has archived collected files with WinRAR, prior to exfiltration.[1] |
Enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection |
Operation Wocao has used a script to collect information about the infected system.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1115 | Clipboard Data |
Operation Wocao has collected clipboard data in plaintext.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1059 | .001 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell |
Operation Wocao has used PowerShell on compromised systems.[1] |
.003 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell |
Operation Wocao has spawned a new |
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.005 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic |
Operation Wocao has used a VBScript to conduct reconnaissance on targeted systems.[1] |
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.006 | Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python |
Operation Wocao's backdoors have been written in Python and compiled with py2exe.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1555 | .005 | Credentials from Password Stores: Password Managers |
Operation Wocao has accessed and collected credentials from password managers.[1] |
Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System |
Operation Wocao has exfiltrated files and directories of interest from the targeted system.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1001 | Data Obfuscation |
Operation Wocao has encrypted IP addresses used for "Agent" proxy hops with RC4.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1074 | .001 | Data Staged: Local Data Staging |
Operation Wocao has staged archived files in a temporary directory prior to exfiltration.[1] |
Enterprise | T1573 | .002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Cryptography |
Operation Wocao's proxy implementation "Agent" can upgrade the socket in use to a TLS socket.[1] |
Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel |
Operation Wocao has used the Xserver backdoor to exfiltrate data.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application |
Operation Wocao has gained initial access via vulnerable webservers.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1133 | External Remote Services |
Operation Wocao has used stolen credentials to connect to the victim's network via VPN.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
Operation Wocao has gathered a recursive directory listing to find files and directories of interest.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1562 | .004 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall |
Operation Wocao has used PowerShell to add and delete rules in the Windows firewall.[1] |
Enterprise | T1070 | .001 | Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs |
Operation Wocao has deleted Windows Event Logs to hinder forensic investigation.[1] |
.004 | Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion |
Operation Wocao has deleted logs and executable files used during an intrusion.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Operation Wocao can download additional files to the infected system.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1056 | .001 | Input Capture: Keylogging |
Operation Wocao has obtained the password for the victim's password manager via a custom keylogger.[1] |
Enterprise | T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
Operation Wocao has used SMB to copy files to and from target systems.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry |
Operation Wocao has enabled Wdigest by changing the registry value from 0 to 1.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1111 | Multi-Factor Authentication Interception |
Operation Wocao has used a custom collection method to intercept two-factor authentication soft tokens.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1106 | Native API |
Operation Wocao has used the CreateProcessA and ShellExecute API function to launch commands after being injected into a selected process.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery |
Operation Wocao has scanned for open ports and used nbtscan to find NETBIOS nameservers.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery |
Operation Wocao has discovered network disks mounted to the system using netstat.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol |
Operation Wocao has used a custom protocol for command and control.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information |
Operation Wocao has executed PowerShell commands which were encoded or compressed using Base64, zlib, and XOR.[1] |
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.005 | Indicator Removal from Tools |
Operation Wocao has edited variable names within the Impacket suite to avoid automated detection.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1003 | .001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory |
Operation Wocao has used ProcDump to dump credentials from memory.[1] |
.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |
Operation Wocao has used Mimikatz's DCSync to dump credentials from the memory of the targeted system.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery |
Operation Wocao has discovered removable disks attached to a system.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1069 | .001 | Permission Groups Discovery: Local Groups |
Operation Wocao has used the command |
Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery |
Operation Wocao has collected a list of running processes on the infected system.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection |
Operation Wocao has injected code into a selected process, which in turn launches a command as a child process of the original.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1090 | Proxy |
Operation Wocao has used a custom proxy tool called "Agent" which has support for multiple hops.[1] |
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.001 | Internal Proxy |
Operation Wocao can proxy traffic through multiple infected systems.[1] |
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.003 | Multi-hop Proxy |
Operation Wocao has executed commands through the installed web shell via Tor exit nodes.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1012 | Query Registry |
Operation Wocao has queried the registry to detect recent PuTTY sessions.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1021 | .002 | Remote Services: SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
Operation Wocao has used Impacket's smbexec.py as well as accessing the C$ and IPC$ shares to move laterally.[1] |
Enterprise | T1018 | Remote System Discovery |
Operation Wocao can use the |
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Enterprise | T1053 | .005 | Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task |
Operation Wocao has used scheduled tasks to execute malicious PowerShell code on remote systems.[1] |
Enterprise | T1505 | .003 | Server Software Component: Web Shell |
Operation Wocao has used their own web shells, as well as those previously placed on target systems by other threat actors, for reconnaissance and lateral movement.[1] |
Enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery |
Operation Wocao has collected a list of installed software on the infected system.[1] |
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.001 | Security Software Discovery |
Operation Wocao has used scripts to detect security software.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1558 | .003 | Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting |
Operation Wocao has used PowerSploit's Invoke-Kerberoast module to request encrypted service tickets and bruteforce the passwords of Windows service accounts offline.[1] |
Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery |
Operation Wocao has discovered the local disks attached to the system and their hardware information including manufacturer and model, as well as the OS versions of systems connected to a targeted network.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery |
Operation Wocao has discovered the local network configuration with ipconfig.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery |
Operation Wocao has collected a list of open connections on the infected system using netstat and checks whether it has an internet connection.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery |
Operation Wocao has enumerated sessions and users on a remote host, and identified privileged users logged into a targeted system.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1007 | System Service Discovery |
Operation Wocao has used the |
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Enterprise | T1569 | .002 | System Services: Service Execution |
Operation Wocao has created services on remote systems for execution purposes.[1] |
Enterprise | T1124 | System Time Discovery |
Operation Wocao has used the |
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Enterprise | T1552 | .004 | Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys |
Operation Wocao has used Mimikatz to dump certificates and private keys from the Windows certificate store.[1] |
Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts |
Operation Wocao has used valid VPN credentials to gain initial access.[1] |
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.002 | Domain Accounts |
Operation Wocao has used domain credentials, including domain admin, for lateral movement and privilege escalation.[1] |
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.003 | Local Accounts |
Operation Wocao has used local account credentials found during the intrusion for lateral movement and privilege escalation.[1] |
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Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation |
Operation Wocao has used WMI to execute commands.[1] |