OS Credential Dumping: Security Account Manager

Adversaries may attempt to extract credential material from the Security Account Manager (SAM) database either through in-memory techniques or through the Windows Registry where the SAM database is stored. The SAM is a database file that contains local accounts for the host, typically those found with the net user command. Enumerating the SAM database requires SYSTEM level access.

A number of tools can be used to retrieve the SAM file through in-memory techniques:

Alternatively, the SAM can be extracted from the Registry with Reg:

  • reg save HKLM\sam sam
  • reg save HKLM\system system

Creddump7 can then be used to process the SAM database locally to retrieve hashes.[1]

Notes: RID 500 account is the local, built-in administrator. RID 501 is the guest account.* User accounts start with a RID of 1,000+.

ID: T1003.002
Sub-technique of:  T1003
Platforms: Windows
Permissions Required: SYSTEM
Contributors: Ed Williams, Trustwave, SpiderLabs
Version: 1.0
Created: 11 February 2020
Last Modified: 25 March 2020

Procedure Examples

ID Name Description
S0154 Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike can recover hashed passwords.[2]

S0050 CosmicDuke

CosmicDuke collects Windows account hashes.[3]

S0046 CozyCar

Password stealer and NTLM stealer modules in CozyCar harvest stored credentials from the victim, including credentials used as part of Windows NTLM user authentication.[4]

S0488 CrackMapExec

CrackMapExec can dump usernames and hashed passwords from the SAM.[5]

G0035 Dragonfly

Dragonfly has dropped and executed SecretsDump to dump password hashes.[6]

S0120 Fgdump

Fgdump can dump Windows password hashes.[7]

G0093 GALLIUM

GALLIUM used reg commands to dump specific hives from the Windows Registry, such as the SAM hive, and obtain password hashes.[8]

S0008 gsecdump

gsecdump can dump Windows password hashes from the SAM.[9]

S0376 HOPLIGHT

HOPLIGHT has the capability to harvest credentials and passwords from the SAM database.[10]

S0357 Impacket

SecretsDump and Mimikatz modules within Impacket can perform credential dumping to obtain account and password information.[11]

G0004 Ke3chang

Ke3chang has dumped credentials, including by using gsecdump.[12][13]

S0250 Koadic

Koadic can gather hashed passwords by dumping SAM/SECURITY hive.[14]

G0045 menuPass

menuPass has used a modified version of pentesting tools wmiexec.vbs and secretsdump.py to dump credentials.[15][16]

S0002 Mimikatz

Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the SAM table.[17][18][19][20]

S0080 Mivast

Mivast has the capability to gather NTLM password information.[21]

G0014 Night Dragon

Night Dragon has dumped account hashes with Carbanak and cracked them with Cain & Abel.[22]

S0371 POWERTON

POWERTON has the ability to dump password hashes.[23]

S0006 pwdump

pwdump can be used to dump credentials from the SAM.[24]

S0125 Remsec

Remsec can dump the SAM database.[25]

G0027 Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 actors have used gsecdump to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.[26][27]

G0102 Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider has acquired credentials from the SAM/SECURITY registry hives.[28]

Mitigations

ID Mitigation Description
M1028 Operating System Configuration

Consider disabling or restricting NTLM.[29]

M1027 Password Policies

Ensure that local administrator accounts have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network.

M1026 Privileged Account Management

Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.

M1017 User Training

Limit credential overlap across accounts and systems by training users and administrators not to use the same password for multiple accounts.

Detection

ID Data Source Data Component
DS0017 Command Command Execution
DS0022 File File Access
DS0024 Windows Registry Windows Registry Key Access

Hash dumpers open the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) on the local file system (%SystemRoot%/system32/config/SAM) or create a dump of the Registry SAM key to access stored account password hashes. Some hash dumpers will open the local file system as a device and parse to the SAM table to avoid file access defenses. Others will make an in-memory copy of the SAM table before reading hashes. Detection of compromised Valid Accounts in-use by adversaries may help as well.

References

  1. Flathers, R. (2018, February 19). creddump7. Retrieved April 11, 2018.
  2. Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
  3. F-Secure Labs. (2015, September 17). The Dukes: 7 years of Russian cyberespionage. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  4. F-Secure Labs. (2015, April 22). CozyDuke: Malware Analysis. Retrieved December 10, 2015.
  5. byt3bl33d3r. (2018, September 8). SMB: Command Reference. Retrieved July 17, 2020.
  6. US-CERT. (2018, March 16). Alert (TA18-074A): Russian Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors. Retrieved June 6, 2018.
  7. Mandiant. (n.d.). APT1 Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units. Retrieved July 18, 2016.
  8. Cybereason Nocturnus. (2019, June 25). Operation Soft Cell: A Worldwide Campaign Against Telecommunications Providers. Retrieved July 18, 2019.
  9. TrueSec. (n.d.). gsecdump v2.0b5. Retrieved September 29, 2015.
  10. US-CERT. (2019, April 10). MAR-10135536-8 – North Korean Trojan: HOPLIGHT. Retrieved April 19, 2019.
  11. SecureAuth. (n.d.). Retrieved January 15, 2019.
  12. Villeneuve, N., Bennett, J. T., Moran, N., Haq, T., Scott, M., & Geers, K. (2014). OPERATION “KE3CHANG”: Targeted Attacks Against Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
  13. Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.
  14. Magius, J., et al. (2017, July 19). Koadic. Retrieved June 18, 2018.
  15. PwC and BAE Systems. (2017, April). Operation Cloud Hopper: Technical Annex. Retrieved April 13, 2017.
  1. Twi1ight. (2015, July 11). AD-Pentest-Script - wmiexec.vbs. Retrieved June 29, 2017.
  2. Deply, B. (n.d.). Mimikatz. Retrieved September 29, 2015.
  3. Deply, B., Le Toux, V. (2016, June 5). module ~ lsadump. Retrieved August 7, 2017.
  4. Grafnetter, M. (2015, October 26). Retrieving DPAPI Backup Keys from Active Directory. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
  5. The Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand National Cyber Security Centre (NZ NCSC), CERT New Zealand, the UK National Cyber Security Centre (UK NCSC) and the US National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC). (2018, October 11). Joint report on publicly available hacking tools. Retrieved March 11, 2019.
  6. Stama, D.. (2015, February 6). Backdoor.Mivast. Retrieved February 15, 2016.
  7. McAfee® Foundstone® Professional Services and McAfee Labs™. (2011, February 10). Global Energy Cyberattacks: “Night Dragon”. Retrieved February 19, 2018.
  8. Ackerman, G., et al. (2018, December 21). OVERRULED: Containing a Potentially Destructive Adversary. Retrieved January 17, 2019.
  9. Wikipedia. (2007, August 9). pwdump. Retrieved June 22, 2016.
  10. Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2016, August 9). The ProjectSauron APT. Technical Analysis. Retrieved August 17, 2016.
  11. Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.
  12. Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
  13. Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.
  14. Microsoft. (2012, November 29). Using security policies to restrict NTLM traffic. Retrieved December 4, 2017.