| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1056.001 | Keylogging |
| T1056.002 | GUI Input Capture |
| T1056.003 | Web Portal Capture |
| T1056.004 | Credential API Hooking |
Adversaries may hook into Windows application programming interface (API) functions to collect user credentials. Malicious hooking mechanisms may capture API calls that include parameters that reveal user authentication credentials.[1] Unlike Keylogging, this technique focuses specifically on API functions that include parameters that reveal user credentials. Hooking involves redirecting calls to these functions and can be implemented via:
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| S0484 | Carberp |
Carberp has hooked several Windows API functions to steal credentials.[7] |
| S0363 | Empire |
Empire contains some modules that leverage API hooking to carry out tasks, such as netripper.[8] |
| S0182 | FinFisher |
FinFisher hooks processes by modifying IAT pointers to CreateWindowEx.[9][3] |
| S0353 | NOKKI |
NOKKI uses the Windows call SetWindowsHookEx and begins injecting it into every GUI process running on the victim's machine.[10] |
| G0068 | PLATINUM |
PLATINUM is capable of using Windows hook interfaces for information gathering such as credential access.[11] |
| S0416 | RDFSNIFFER |
RDFSNIFFER hooks several Win32 API functions to hijack elements of the remote system management user-interface.[12] |
| S0266 | TrickBot |
TrickBot has the ability to capture RDP credentials by capturing the |
| S0386 | Ursnif |
Ursnif has hooked APIs to perform a wide variety of information theft, such as monitoring traffic from browsers.[14] |
| S0251 | Zebrocy |
Zebrocy installs an application-defined Windows hook to get notified when a network drive has been attached, so it can then use the hook to call its RecordToFile file stealing method.[15] |
| S0330 | Zeus Panda |
Zeus Panda hooks processes by leveraging its own IAT hooked functions.[16] |
| S0412 | ZxShell |
ZxShell hooks several API functions to spawn system threads.[17] |
This type of attack technique cannot be easily mitigated with preventive controls since it is based on the abuse of system features.
| ID | Data Source | Data Component |
|---|---|---|
| DS0009 | Process | OS API Execution |
| Process Metadata |
Monitor for calls to the SetWindowsHookEx and SetWinEventHook functions, which install a hook procedure.[2][18] Also consider analyzing hook chains (which hold pointers to hook procedures for each type of hook) using tools[18][19][20] or by programmatically examining internal kernel structures.[21][22]
Rootkits detectors[23] can also be used to monitor for various types of hooking activity.
Verify integrity of live processes by comparing code in memory to that of corresponding static binaries, specifically checking for jumps and other instructions that redirect code flow. Also consider taking snapshots of newly started processes[24] to compare the in-memory IAT to the real addresses of the referenced functions.[25][4]