| ID | Name |
|---|---|
| T1078.001 | Default Accounts |
| T1078.002 | Domain Accounts |
| T1078.003 | Local Accounts |
| T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts |
Adversaries may obtain and abuse credentials of a cloud account as a means of gaining Initial Access, Persistence, Privilege Escalation, or Defense Evasion. Cloud accounts are those created and configured by an organization for use by users, remote support, services, or for administration of resources within a cloud service provider or SaaS application. In some cases, cloud accounts may be federated with traditional identity management system, such as Window Active Directory.[1][2][3]
Compromised credentials for cloud accounts can be used to harvest sensitive data from online storage accounts and databases. Access to cloud accounts can also be abused to gain Initial Access to a network by abusing a Trusted Relationship. Similar to Domain Accounts, compromise of federated cloud accounts may allow adversaries to more easily move laterally within an environment.
Once a cloud account is compromised, an adversary may perform Account Manipulation - for example, by adding Additional Cloud Roles - to maintain persistence and potentially escalate their privileges.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| G0007 | APT28 |
APT28 has used compromised Office 365 service accounts with Global Administrator privileges to collect email from user inboxes.[4] |
| G0016 | APT29 |
APT29 has used a compromised O365 administrator account to create a new Service Principal.[5] |
| G0064 | APT33 |
APT33 has used compromised Office 365 accounts in tandem with Ruler in an attempt to gain control of endpoints.[6] |
| G0004 | Ke3chang |
Ke3chang has used compromised credentials to sign into victims’ Microsoft 365 accounts.[7] |
| S0683 | Peirates |
Peirates can use stolen service account tokens to perform its operations.[8] |
| S0684 | ROADTools |
ROADTools leverages valid cloud credentials to perform enumeration operations using the internal Azure AD Graph API.[9] |
| ID | Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|---|
| M1032 | Multi-factor Authentication |
Use multi-factor authentication for cloud accounts, especially privileged accounts. This can be implemented in a variety of forms (e.g. hardware, virtual, SMS), and can also be audited using administrative reporting features.[10] |
| M1027 | Password Policies |
Ensure that cloud accounts, particularly privileged accounts, have complex, unique passwords across all systems on the network. Passwords and access keys should be rotated regularly. This limits the amount of time credentials can be used to access resources if a credential is compromised without your knowledge. Cloud service providers may track access key age to help audit and identify keys that may need to be rotated.[10] |
| M1026 | Privileged Account Management |
Review privileged cloud account permission levels routinely to look for those that could allow an adversary to gain wide access.[11][12] These reviews should also check if new privileged cloud accounts have been created that were not authorized. |
| M1018 | User Account Management |
Periodically review user accounts and remove those that are inactive or unnecessary. Limit the ability for user accounts to create additional accounts. |
| M1017 | User Training |
Applications may send push notifications to verify a login as a form of multi-factor authentication (MFA). Train users to only accept valid push notifications and to report suspicious push notifications. |
| ID | Data Source | Data Component |
|---|---|---|
| DS0028 | Logon Session | Logon Session Creation |
| Logon Session Metadata | ||
| DS0002 | User Account | User Account Authentication |
Monitor the activity of cloud accounts to detect abnormal or malicious behavior, such as accessing information outside of the normal function of the account or account usage at atypical hours.