Malicious applications are a common attack vector used by adversaries to gain a presence on mobile devices. This technique describes installing a malicious application on targeted mobile devices without involving an authorized app store (e.g., Google Play Store or Apple App Store). Adversaries may wish to avoid placing malicious applications in an authorized app store due to increased potential risk of detection or other reasons. However, mobile devices often are configured to allow application installation only from an authorized app store which would prevent this technique from working.
Delivery methods for the malicious application include:
Some Android malware comes with functionality to install additional applications, either automatically or when the adversary instructs it to.[4]
ID | Name | Description |
---|---|---|
S0440 | Agent Smith |
Agent Smith has been distributed through the 9apps app store.[5] |
S0304 | Android/Chuli.A |
Android/Chuli.A was delivered via a spearphishing message containing a malicious Android application as an attachment.[6] |
S0524 | AndroidOS/MalLocker.B |
AndroidOS/MalLocker.B has been spread using direct download links. [7] |
S0422 | Anubis | |
S0540 | Asacub |
Asacub has been spread via phishing SMS messages that contain a link to a website that hosts the malicious APK file.[9] |
G0097 | Bouncing Golf |
Bouncing Golf delivered GolfSpy via a hosted application binary advertised on social media.[10] |
S0432 | Bread | |
S0480 | Cerberus |
Cerberus has been delivered to the device via websites that prompt the user to "[…] install Adobe Flash Player" and then downloads the malicious APK to the device.[12] |
G0070 | Dark Caracal |
Dark Caracal distributes Pallas via trojanized applications hosted on watering hole websites.[13] |
S0507 | eSurv |
eSurv has been distributed via phishing websites with geo-restrictions that allow access to only Italian and Turkmenistani mobile carriers. eSurv can install applications via malicious iOS provisioning profiles containing the developer’s certificate.[14] |
S0522 | Exobot | |
S0509 | FakeSpy |
FakeSpy is spread via direct download links in SMS phishing messages.[16] |
S0421 | GolfSpy | |
S0406 | Gustuff |
Gustuff was distributed via SMS phishing messages to numbers exfiltrated from compromised devices’ contact lists. The phishing SMS messages are sent from the compromised device to the target device.[17] |
S0544 | HenBox | |
S0317 | Marcher |
Marcher is delivered via a link sent by SMS or email, including instructions advising the user to modify their Android device security settings to enable apps to be installed from "Unknown Sources."[19] |
S0303 | MazarBOT |
MazarBOT is delivered via an unsolicited text message containing a link to a web download URI.[20] |
S0399 | Pallas |
Pallas has the ability to download and install attacker-specified applications.[13] |
S0539 | Red Alert 2.0 |
Red Alert 2.0 has been distributed via webpages designed to look like the Play Store.[21] |
S0326 | RedDrop |
RedDrop uses ads or other links within websites to encourage users to download the malicious apps using a complex content distribution network (CDN) and series of network redirects. RedDrop also downloads additional components (APKs, JAR files) from different C2 servers.[22] |
S0403 | Riltok |
Riltok is distributed via phishing SMS messages from infected devices.[23] |
S0411 | Rotexy |
Rotexy is distributed through phishing links sent in SMS messages as |
S0313 | RuMMS |
RuMMS is delivered via an SMS message containing a link to an APK (Android application package).[25] |
S0419 | SimBad | |
S0558 | Tiktok Pro |
Tiktok Pro has been distributed via direct download on 3rd party websites, with the link sent in phishing SMS messsages.[27] |
S0302 | Twitoor | |
S0418 | ViceLeaker |
ViceLeaker was primarily distributed via Telegram and WhatsApp messages.[29] |
S0506 | ViperRAT |
ViperRAT has been distributed through 3rd party websites.[30] |
G0112 | Windshift |
Windshift has distributed malicious apps via their own websites during Operation BULL.[31] |
S0318 | XLoader for Android |
XLoader for Android has been distributed via phishing websites.[32] |
S0490 | XLoader for iOS |
XLoader for Android has been distributed via phishing SMS messages, which link to a malicious website hosting a device profile.[32] |
S0311 | YiSpecter |
YiSpecter's malicious apps were signed with iOS enterprise certificates issued by Apple to allow the apps to be installed as enterprise apps on non-jailbroken iOS devices.[33] |
S0287 | ZergHelper |
ZergHelper abuses enterprises certificate and personal certificates to sign and distribute apps.[34] |
ID | Mitigation | Description |
---|---|---|
M1012 | Enterprise Policy |
On iOS, the |
M1011 | User Guidance |
iOS 9 and above requires explicit user consent before allowing installation of applications signed with enterprise distribution keys rather than installed from Apple's App Store. Users should be encouraged to not agree to installation of applications signed with enterprise distribution keys unless absolutely certain of the source of the application. On Android, the "Unknown Sources" setting must be enabled for users to install apps from sources other than an authorized app store (such as the Google Play Store), so users should be encouraged not to enable that setting. |